Reduced attentional control in individuals with a history of suicide attempts compared to those with suicidal ideation: Results from a systematic review and meta-analysis.

BACKGROUND: Neurocognitive profiles may be especially useful to identify factors that facilitate transitioning from contemplating suicide to attempting suicide. Generally, those who attempt suicide show greater disruptions in neurocognitive ability compared to those who think about suicide but do not proceed to attempt. The goal of this systematic review and meta-analysis is to test whether this pattern is observed with attentional control. METHODS: We systematically searched PubMed, PsychINFO, CINAHL, and Google Scholar to find pertinent studies. All included studies compared attentional functioning using neutral stimuli. Each sample featured adults with a history of suicidal ideation (SI) and no history of suicide attempts (SA) compared to those with a history of SA. RESULTS: We identified 15 studies with 32 effect sizes (N = 931; n = 506 with SI only; n = 425 with SA). SA groups, compared to SI groups, exhibited worse accuracy yet similar reaction time, suggesting a comparatively blunted speed-accuracy tradeoff. Relative to SI, SA groups performed worse on Stroop-like and Go/NoGo tasks. SA performed better than SI on Trail Making Test B, but not A. LIMITATIONS: There were few available studies. Most samples were small. We did not differentiate current vs. past SI or high vs. low lethality SA. Only English and Spanish language articles were included. CONCLUSIONS: Disrupted attentional control may convey risk for transitioning to SA from SI. More work is needed to determine which components of attention are most associated with suicide risk.

Hallucination-Proneness is Associated With a Decrease in Robust Averaging of Perceptual Evidence.

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS: Hallucinations are characterized by disturbances in perceptual decision-making about environmental stimuli. When integrating across multiple stimuli to form a perceptual decision, typical observers engage in "robust averaging" by down-weighting extreme perceptual evidence, akin to a statistician excluding outlying data. Furthermore, observers adapt to contexts with more unreliable evidence by increasing this down-weighting strategy. Here, we test the hypothesis that hallucination-prone individuals (n = 38 high vs n = 91 low) would show a decrease in this robust averaging and diminished sensitivity to changes in evidence variance. STUDY DESIGN: We used a multielement perceptual averaging task to elicit dichotomous judgments about the "average color" (red/blue) of an array of stimuli in trials with varied strength (mean) and reliability (variance) of decision-relevant perceptual evidence. We fitted computational models to task behavior, with a focus on a log-posterior-ratio (LPR) model which integrates evidence as a function of the log odds of each perceptual option and produces a robust averaging effect. STUDY RESULTS: Hallucination-prone individuals demonstrated less robust averaging, seeming to weigh inlying and outlying extreme or untrustworthy evidence more equally. Furthermore, the model that integrated evidence as a function of the LPR of the two perceptual options and produced robust averaging showed poorer fit for the group prone to hallucinations. Finally, the weighting strategy in hallucination-prone individuals remained insensitive to evidence variance. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings provide empirical support for theoretical proposals regarding evidence integration aberrations in psychosis and alterations in the perceptual systems that track statistical regularities in environmental stimuli.

Conspiratorial Thinking During COVID-19: The Roles of Paranoia, Delusion-Proneness, and Intolerance of Uncertainty.

The COVID-19 global pandemic has left many feeling a sense of profound uncertainty about their world, safety, and livelihood. Sources espousing misinformation and conspiracy theories frequently offer information that can help make sense of this uncertainty. Individuals high in intolerance of uncertainty (IU) may be particularly impacted by the impoverished epistemic environment and may thus be more drawn to conspiratorial thinking (CT). In the present work, we show across 2 studies (N = 519) that COVID-19-specific CT is associated with higher levels of IU as well as delusion-proneness, and paranoia. Furthermore, delusion-proneness and paranoia explained the relationship between IU and CT and emerged as independent partial correlates of CT even when controlling for other facets of schizotypy. In contrast, anxiety did not explain the relationship between IU and CT. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of individual differences in IU, delusion-proneness and paranoia in the development of CT in the context of the acute uncertainty of a global crisis, in which conspiracy theories are more prevalent and salient. Informational intervention designs may benefit from leveraging the body of work demonstrating the efficacy of targeting IU to incite meaningful changes in thinking.